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ABSTRACT
This article is on the hidden state interest that article 52(§1) of
the Chinese Contract Law protects and the questionable
applicability of freedom of contract to Chinese state-owned
enterprises (hereafter “SOEs”). In common law, fraud and duress
make a contract voidable. In Western civil law jurisdictions,
including Louisiana, fraud and duress make a contract relatively
null. Article 52(§1) of the Chinese Contract Law renders a contract
induced by fraud and duress absolutely null (null and void if using
common law terminology) when state interest is harmed. At the
same time, according to article 54 of the Contract Law, fraud and
duress only make a contract relatively null just like in Western
laws. The situation is further complicated by article 58 of General
Principles of Civil Law (hereinafter “G.P.C.L.”), which renders all
civil juristic acts absolutely null when induced by fraud and duress.
To understand when a contract is null or annullable one has to
reconcile these three statutory provisions and figure out what the
state interest article 52(1) refers to. This article attempts to
demystify this state interest through a historical survey of the
evolution of contract law in the communist regime in China in
comparison with the similar path Soviet civil law had gone
through. If it simply means public interest, Chinese law is no
different than the western counterparts. If it means something
different, a secretive enlarged state power to declare nullity and
invade freedom of contract might come with this law. Given the
principal-agent relationship between the state and SOEs regarding
the ownership rights of SOE assets, the absence of a sufficiently
competitive market, the incentive incompatibility between the state
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and SOEs, an enlarged state power over contractual autonomy is
therefore implied and justified. This article suggests that such a
state interest be state-owned enterprises’ financial interest, which
is different from public interest. As a result, freedom of contract
shall not be applicable to Chinese SOEs when ownership rights
and a competitive market are missing, and a different interpretation
of nullity law should be adopted to protect SOEs’ financial
interest.
I. INTRODUCTION
In Western civil law jurisdictions, a contract that violates the
law, public policy or morality is absolutely null. 1 A contract that
was entered into through fraud or duress is relatively null: 2 it is
valid unless the victim of the wrongdoing asks to have it annulled.3
There is good reason for the distinction. If a contract violates the
law, public policy or morality, it should not be valid whether the
parties wish it to be or not. If a contract is induced by fraud or
1. See K. ZWEIGERT & H. KÖTZ, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE
LAW 381 (3d ed., Tony Weir trans., Oxford 1998).
2. There is a conceptual difference between common law and civil law that
can be reflected in the choice of terminology between voidable and relatively
null. Common law contract law concerns the enforceability of a promise and the
voidability of the contract is raised by the promisor as a defense to bar the
enforcement of a promise. In civil law, a relatively null contract is valid until
declared null by a court upon the request of the aggrieved party. China adopted
the civil law approach and requires, when certain circumstances warrant a
revocable contract, the aggrieved party to request the court to have a contract
annulled or revoked. See Chinese Contract Law art. 54. Therefore, in this article,
I refer to contracts induced by fraud and duress as “relatively null contracts” in
conformity with the civil law tradition. Also, as appeared in the official
translation of Chinese contract law, the term “null and void” was adopted to
correspond to the concept of “absolutely nullity” in the mainstream civil law. In
this article, I will quote the term “null and void” in reference to “absolutely
null”. The contracts that are relatively null are phrased literally as “revocable
and modifiable” contracts in Chinese statutes. Chinese law gives the aggrieved
party not only the option to nullify such contracts as they are “revocable”, but
also the power to modify the contract if they can reach agreement with the party
at fault.
3. For example, under German law, a declaration of intention that is
induced by fraud or duress, and therefore not genuine, is only voidable. See
Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch [BGB] [Civil Code] art. 123 (Ger.). Under French law,
error, violence, and deceit are vices to consent, making the contract relatively
null. See Code civil [C. CIV.] art. 1109, 1110, 1113, 1116 (Fr.).
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duress, it should be valid only if the victim so chooses. A buyer
may have been fraudulently induced to pay 100 for goods with a
market value of 80. In this case, he should be able to withdraw
from the contract and get restitution damage- return the goods and
get the 100 back. But, if the market price suddenly jumped to 120,
he should be able to enforce it. He should also be able to enforce it
if the goods are unique and worth more than 100 to him personally.
When relative nullity exists, why should the law allow the
aggrieved party to determine the validity of the contract rather than
declare the contract null and void ab initio? Clear classification of
nullities had not been achieved by Roman law. 4 The modern
classification of nullities and the widespread recognition of relative
nullity in the civil law world owes to the rise of freedom of
contract and will theories as a result of the 19th century liberalism
and laissez-faire capitalism. 5 The reasoning behind relative nullity
is usually that party will know his own interest better than the court
and courts shall not interfere with contracting parties’ free will, as
dictated by the principle of freedom of contract. The wills of the
contracting parties and their consent that relative nullity law tries
to protect were not the central theme of contract law before the
19th century. However, since the rise of will theories and freedom
of contract, the classical contract theory has “the tendency to
attribute all the consequences of a contract to the will of those who
made it.” 6 As a result, “the primary function of the contract came
to be seen as purely facultative, and the function of the court was
merely to resolve a dispute by working out the implications of
what the parties had already chosen to do.” 7
4. The detailed accounts of the historical confusions can be seen in
REINHARD ZIMMERMANN, THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS: ROMAN FOUNDATIONS OF
THE CIVILIAN TRADITION 679 (1990); see also Ronald J. Scalise Jr., Rethinking
the Doctrine of Nullity, 74 LA. L. REV. 665 (2014).
5. The relevant provisions in French Civil Code are a typical product of
this movement. See supra note 2.
6. P.S. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 404
(Oxford 1979).
7. Id. at 408.
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The core of freedom of contract is to give binding force to
whatever is mutually agreed between the contracting parties. 8
Thus, to ensure freedom of bargaining, which was regarded as “the
fundamental and indispensable requisite of progress” 9 by the 19th
century economists, courts shall not step in to rectify an unfair
bargain “since the force of competition will ensure fairness in
terms and prices.” 10
When the vice of consent in a contract only affects the interest
of the contracting parties, nullity of contract can only be asserted
by the party shouldering the negative consequence of this defect.
The aggrieved parties are the only class of people the law of
relative nullity is trying to protect, and the law gives them the
option to confirm the act. Whenever they decide to confirm the
validity of a defective contract that does not impair public or bona
fide third party’s interest, they are acting in their own interest, and
they are in a better position than the court to estimate the
consequence of annulling a contract for themselves. In addition to
protecting freedom of contract, the rules of relative nullity also
operate to guarantee the safety of transactions. They give an
incentive for parties to engage in business transactions by assuring
them of their power to rescind the contract on their own initiative
barring circumstances where the contractual defects will interfere
with the interest of the public or a third party.
The unrestricted role the rise of capitalism and 19th century
liberalism placed on the will has undoubtedly declined as so
declared by Gilmore and Atiyah. 11 According to them, the destiny
8. Article 1134 of the French Civil Code describes this principle as such:
“contracts legally formed have the force of law for the parties who made them.”
Chinese law adopted the idea of contractual freedom for the first time in 1999
through art. 4 of the Contract Law: “The parties have the right to lawfully enter
into a contract of their own free will in accordance with the law, and no unit or
individual may illegally interfere therewith.”
9. JAMES GORDLEY, THE PHILOSOPHICAL ORIGINS OF MODERN CONTRACT
DOCTRINE 214 (Oxford 1991).
10. ATIYAH, supra note 6, at 405.
11. See generally GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT (Ohio State
Univ. Press, 1974); ATIYAH, supra note 6.
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of freedom of contract is closely related to that of general theories
of contract law, and neither of the two existed before the 19th
century. The role of freedom of contract has been declining when
the dominant role of the general theory of contract was gradually
taken over bit by bit by the rise of protection of consumer interests
in transactions where the bargaining powers are extremely
unequal, limitations placed by special contracts such as the
adhesion contracts, the emergence of regulatory law, and
sophisticated commercial contracts that will allow parties to opt
out of the requirements what freedom of contract would expect.
Still, in the west as in most parts of the world, freedom of contract
as a doctrine survived these attacks and is widely respected outside
the particular areas of the contract law mentioned above.
Nevertheless, contract law certainly predates capitalism and
will theories and principles such as equality in exchange,
commutative justice, and fairness guided contractual transactions
in pre-commercial societies and post commercial but pre-capitalist
civil law without the will theories. 12 With all the difficulties and
discredits mentioned earlier, does every industrialized society have
to have contract theories that are based solely on the will and
autonomy? Shall freedom of contract be applied to all human
societies regardless of any features in its economy or are there
certain prerequisites a society must entail for this doctrine to be
justified and therefore become desirable?
This investigation on the relative nullity of contract in Chinese
law serves as a test to examine whether freedom of contract,
borrowed from the West and recognized as a fundamental principle
of Chinese contract law, should be preconditioned on certain
prerequisites such as the existence of private ownership and the
availability of a competitive market. More specifically, I hope to
test whether freedom of contract is applicable to Chinese state12. See generally James Gordley, Contract in Pre-Commercial Societies
and in Western History in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE
LAW (J.C.B. Mohr ed., 1997).
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owned enterprises (SOEs) by investigating whether Chinese SOEs
are afforded the option the relative nullity law provides
theoretically to all contracting parties. I am of the opinion that, if
freedom of contract is not applicable to China or Chinese SOEs, it
is only reasonable that a different kind of relative nullity law
should be adopted in China to serve the economic features unique
to China.
In China, given the nuances arising from the innerconsistencies of various statutory provisions, the question whether
a contract is absolutely null or relatively null is unclear. 13 At first
sight, the law seems contradictory. Contracts are governed by the
Contract Law enacted in 1999. Article 54 provides that, as in
Western jurisdictions, a party who was induced to enter a contract
by fraud or duress may have it annulled or modified. Article 52
provides that a contact is “null and void” if it “is concluded
through the use of fraud or coercion by one party to damage the
interests of the State” (§1); if it “harms the public interest” (§4); or
if it “violates the compulsory provisions of the laws and
administrative regulations” (§5).
If article 52 merely meant that a contract is null and void when
it is illegal or offends public policy or morality, Chinese law would

13. Western civil law scholars have raised the possibility of adding a third
category of nullity, namely, mixed nullity for civil juristic acts or contracts that
do not fit neatly within the traditional dichotomy of nullity. See Scalise, supra
note 4. In determining the validity of contract or civil juristic act, Chinese law
does introduce a third category: effect-to-be-determined contract or act, to put
the legal effect of a contract or civil juristic act entered with inadequate civil
capacity on hold pending on the confirmation or denial of the party with
adequate capacity. The most relevant example is that a joint venture agreement
between a Chinese domestic enterprise and a foreign enterprise is subject to state
approval. Before such approval, the agreement is considered neither a valid nor
an invalid contract. This situation is common in foreign investment transactions
where thestate will have paternalistic power over the validity of the contract. For
example, in the United States, the President has the power to suspend or prohibit
foreign acquisitions on the grounds of national security. See 50 U.S.C. app.
§2170(d). This article focuses solely on the tension between relative and
absolute nullity under Chinese law, and therefore consciously avoids the
complications mixed nullity would add to Chinese nullity law.
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be like that of Western jurisdictions. In the case of fraud or duress,
a contract would be relatively null at the instance of the wronged
party. In the instance of illegality or immorality, the contract would
be absolutely null. But then there would have been no need for the
statute to provide that a contract is absolutely null, not only when it
violates the law, but when “the use of fraud and duress damage the
interest of the state” (§1) or “malicious collusion committed to
harm the state interest” when the contract neither “harms the public
interest” (§4) nor violates any “laws” or “administrative
regulations” (§5).
Suppose, however, that all contracts were deemed to affect the
“interest of the state” or the “public interest.” As we will see, that
was the official view before the introduction of elements of market
economy in China. To the extent that view still prevails, every
interference with the contracting by fraud and duress would
“damage the interest of the state.” All contracts entered into by
fraud or duress would be absolutely null under article 52(§1). But
then, article 52(§1) would conflict with article 54, which provides
that contracts are annullable for fraud and duress, yet only at the
instance of the wronged party.
The law on the nullification of contracts induced by fraud or
duress has been further complicated by article 58(§3) of the
G.P.C.L., 14 which was enacted in 1986 to provide general
14. Article 58 of the General Principles of Civil Law of the People’s
Republic of China (GPCL—Adopted April 12th, 1986 and Effective January
1st, 1987) provides that:
Civil juristic acts in the following categories shall be null and void:
(1) those performed by a person without legal capacity for civil
conduct;
(2) those that according to law may not be independently performed by
a
person
with
limited
capacity
for
civil
conduct;
(3) those performed by a person against his true intentions as a result of
fraud, duress or exploitation of his unfavorable position by the other
party;
(4) those performed through malicious collusion are detrimental to the
interest of the state, a collective or a third party;
(5) those that violate the law or the public interest;
(6) economic contracts that violate the state's mandatory plans; and
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provisions that were intended to operate as the Book I of the future
Chinese Civil Code. Contract is regarded as a subcategory of “civil
juristic acts” (Rechtsgeschäft) in civil law jurisprudence. Article 58
lists all the circumstances where a civil juristic act is deemed null
and void. This laundry list covers all the circumstances under both
article 52 and article 54 of the 1999 Contract Law without
recognizing annullable civil acts. Under article 58(§3), a civil
juristic act is null and void when a manifestation of intent is
violated by fraud, duress and exploitation of the victim’s
unfavorable position. The literal interpretation of this article would
possibly mean fraud and duress will make a civil juristic act
absolutely null regardless of whether the state interest is harmed,
which conflicts with the two Contract Law articles mentioned
above.
Perhaps, the most direct and effective way to assess the
situation is to examine how courts interpret this provision in
practice. However, this was not feasible until very recently. For
many years, Chinese cases had not been available and accessible to
general public and even the practitioners. In fact, most judicial
opinions had been regarded as state secrets and made available
only to the parties and court personnel. Only in the past few years
had the newly-established search engines and legal research
database started providing a select amount of cases to the public.
For this project, up until the summer of 2013, I was only able to
locate 23 cases decided under article 52 but none of the cases cited
article 52(§1). In spring 2014, with more cases becoming
accessible from the databases, I have identified 99 cases that cited
article 52(§1). Through all these cases, one can easily detect the
fact that courts are splitting on two issues: whether the state

(7) those performed under the guise of legitimate acts conceal
illegitimate purposes.
Civil acts that are null and void shall not be legally binding from the
very beginning.
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interest here is equivalent to public interest or the SOE’s interest; if
and when state interest really means SOEs’ interest, whether SOEs
are afforded the option to keep the contract when there is a defect
in consent induced by fraud or duress. I would like to suggest that
such a hidden interest be the financial interest of SOEs that is
different from public interest or any other interest law or public
policy should protect in a market economy. Nevertheless, such
interest should be otherwise protected given the absence of a
sufficiently competitive market, and incentive incompatibility
between the state as the owner of state assets and SOEs as the
agents of the state. Also, I would like to argue that state should
only exercise this enlarged power to declare the nullity of contract
on the court’s own initiative when there is neglect of duty, where
the situation warrants no reasonable ground to justify the SOE
management’s failure to revoke the contract – the option afforded
by article 54.
Determining which contracts are relatively null and which are
absolutely null under Chinese law is not simply a matter of
reconciling the three statutory provisions. It is a matter of
reconciling the role of the state and the role of contracting parties
in an economy which is in part state managed and in part market
driven. To understand such a battle over contract autonomy, one
has first to figure out what this secret state interest the Chinese
laws are trying so hard to protect is. To see what is at stake, one
must consider the role that contract and contract law played before
and after private markets were introduced in the communist China.
II. CONTRACT LAW UNDER THE COMMUNIST REGIME
A. 1950-1981: The Total Denial of Private Law and Freedom of
Contract
1. The Economic Logic behind Nationalization
Upon the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in
1949, private ownership of land and industry was gradually
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eliminated in order to implement the heavy industry oriented
economic strategy. Following the massive nationalization of
industry and commerce and the establishment of the state-owned
enterprises (SOEs), a free and competitive market was gone and
the price distortion emerged to artificially lower the cost in
developing heavy industry. Such price distortion made it
impossible for the state to evaluate the SOEs’ management
performance by using profit rate as the primary indicator, as it has
been used in a market economy. Under these circumstances,
without an effective governance model, the incentive
incompatibility and information asymmetry between state and
SOEs would not permit SOEs to have either the autonomy or
business incentive in contracting.
The fact that communist China was founded upon a low level
of industrialization and a backward economic structure made the
government designate the development of heavy industry a
priority, especially given the economic embargo due to the
international disapproval of the new government and military
threats China faced at the time. 15
The profit generated by the same capital in light industry was
270% of that generated in heavy industry in 1957. 16 If given a
choice, private investors likely had much less incentive to invest in
heavy industry, therefore not meeting state expectations.
Therefore, the nationalization of heavy industry and the
replacement of privately-owned enterprises with SOEs became the
alternative. Also, in order to reduce the production costs of heavy
industry, it was essential to bring down the living costs of
industrial workers. 17 Given the fact that private investors would
have had no incentive to invest if the prices had to be distorted to
serve the heavy industry, light industry was also nationalized. 18
15. See JUSTIN YIFU LIN, FANG CAI & ZHOU LI, CHINESE STATE-OWNED
ENTERPRISES REFORM 23 (The Chinese Univ. Press 2001)
16. See id. at 23.
17. See id. at 24.
18. See id.
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Following nationalizations, prices were distorted. A
competitive and free market was no longer available. The
implementation of state economic plans was considered the top
priority for SOEs rather than profit maximization. All this
appeared to be reasonable, since in a highly centrally planned
economy, both profits and deficits can be artificially attributed to a
particular industrial sector or a monopolized enterprise with the
purpose of achieving the government’s economic agenda. In such
an economy, profit can no longer serve as an indicator in the
evaluation of the business performance of SOEs. 19 When the
market was gone, so was market competition. Without market
competition, SOEs acted as monopolies in their designated regions.
Profits and deficits can be easily manipulated by the state’s
decisions in price setting, prioritizing the development of an
industry, or the manufacturing of certain products. It followed that
the incentive to maximize profits should not even be permissible
for the fear that SOE managers might try to intercept the
production residuals at the expense of the implementation of state
economic plans. 20 Nevertheless, the incentive incompatibility
between the state as the owner of the state assets and SOEs as the
managers of the state assets still existed. To protect the state from
managers intercepting industrial residues and misappropriating
state-owned assets, and to supply the lack of sufficient information
in evaluating enterprise performance, it was required that the state
be deeply involved in the daily operation of SOEs, which further
took away the business autonomy and incentive of SOEs.
In the rural areas, the land reform took place which allowed the
peasants to take over land from the landlords by force rather than
by law or administrative decrees. Land ownership was since then
monopolized by state and village collectives. Socialist agricultural
communes were established in 1958 upon the enactment of the
Resolution of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the
19. See id. at 116.
20. See id.
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Communist Party to bring about the agricultural collectivization
and state monopoly of crops. The commune supplied all the
economic resources and means of production equally to its
members for free.
As a result of the ownership reform, the only type of ownership
desired and allowed in the country’s economy was public
ownership. 21
When private ownership disappeared in industry and
commerce, and freedom of contract was completely taken away
from enterprises, contract law was no longer considered private
law and contracting became a mere documentation of state
economic plans.
Together with nationalization and as part of its ideological
campaign, the Chinese Communist Party followed the Soviet
Union’s experience in “casting out all prerevolutionary law” in
order to “create a new heaven and a new earth.” 22 As a result, all
pre-existing laws enacted by the Nationalist Government such as
the Civil Code were regarded as evil and something to be
eliminated. 23 Both private economy and private contractual
transactions lost legal legitimacy. With contracting parties losing
all financial incentive to enforce a contract, nullification was no
longer an issue. As a result, contracts other than economic
contracts were either not regulated by law or outlawed entirely.
The Chinese economic system in this period of time imitated the
militant commune system operated in Soviet Union from 1918 to
1921 when private ownership and contract rights had been totally
denied. The later Chinese economic reform resembles the New
Economic Policy adopted by Soviet Union after the failure of the
militant commune system. During both reforms, private ownership
21. Of course, private ownership had to still exist in reality, especially when
it came to personal property.
22. See JEROME ALAN COHEN, CONTEMPORARY CHINESE LAW: RESEARCH
PROBLEMS AND PERSPECTIVES 324 (Oxford Univ. Press, 1970).
23. See MO ZHANG, CHINESE CONTRACT LAW: THEORY AND PRACTICE 2
(Martinus Nijhoff Pubs. 2006).
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and private market were reintroduced along with the resurrection
of legal institutions based on the civilian tradition. However, much
like what happened later in China, the Soviet Union continued to
exercise a central control over the economy and retained extensive
powers to protect the state financial interest in the economy,
thereby largely interfering with freedom of contract.
2. Militant Communism in the Soviet Union
Militant Communism was a period of time from 1917 to 1921
when the Soviet government was fighting the civil war against its
domestic opponents and foreign intervention. During this period of
time, the Soviet government established a communist social order
through massive collectivization and attempted to use central
economic planning to replace markets. 24
A series of fundamental legal and institutional changes began
in 1918 that allowed the government to be the “exclusive owner of
land, industrial and commercial establishments, and the only
producer and distributor of commodities”. 25 The Soviet Union
proclaimed its status as a communist country and at the same time
destroyed the legality of private ownership. The right to contract
disappeared along with property rights.
On November 30th, 1918, the Statute on the Judiciary
abrogated all older laws. 26 On February 19th of the same year, all
private land ownership was abolished. 27 Transactions regarding the
right to use land were also prohibited. 28 Massive confiscations and
nationalization took place. In 1918, several decrees annulled
inheritance rights, stocks, bonds, and confiscated savings. 29
Banking, insurance and foreign trade were also subject to
24.
1946).
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

See VLADMIR GSOVSKI, SOVIET CIVIL LAW 10 (Univ. of Michigan Press
Id.
See id.
See id. at 10.
Id.
Id.
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government monopolies. 30 By June 1919, copyrights and patents
became subject to government monopoly. 31
The government ownership of land and monopoly of crops and
grains was enforced through the establishment of socialist
agriculture communes. Special military detachments were sent to
villages to collect the crops. 32 Peasants could only keep the crops
and grains needed for their bare consumption. The surpluses above
those needed for consumption had to be delivered to the
government at “fixed prices equal to confiscation”. 33 All private
trade in food was forbidden. 34
The Supreme Economic Council was established in 1917 to
manage all the state owned enterprises and confiscate private
enterprises. In 1920, in order to inhibit the undesirable growth of
the private businesses, the council issued an order nationalizing
“all industrial establishments employing ten or more workers, or
even five or more workers if with motorized installations.”35
Following the massive confiscation and governmental regulations,
from 1918 to 1920, all business initiatives were barred as were
private property rights.
Soon enough, the omnipotent state role replaced the private law
and the rigorous state planning left no place for contracting.
According to Goikhbarg, private law such as contract law was
almost entirely absent during the period of militant communism
with one exception, the contract of a village with the shepherd of
the community herd. 36
In 1921, a famine ended militant communism. The New
Economic Policy was introduced and a Russian Soviet Federative
30. Id.
31. November 26, 1918, Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic
(R.S.F.S.R.) Laws 1918, text 900.
32. April 22, 1918, R.S.F.S.R. Laws 1918, text 432; June 11, 1920,
R.S.F.S.R. Laws 1920, text 295; March 13, 1922, R.S.F.S.R. Laws 1922, text
266.
33. R.S.F.S.R. Laws 1917–1918, text 468.
34. R.S.F.S.R. Laws 1917–1918, text 346, §19.
35. R.S.F.S.R. Laws 1920, text 512, §546.
36. See GSOVKI, supra note 24.
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Socialist Republic (R.S.F.S.R.) Civil Code was enacted in 1922,
heavily influenced by the German Civil Code. Starting in May
1922, some confiscated properties were returned to former
owners. 37 Any new confiscation was prohibited for the future. 38
3. The Total Denial of Private Ownership and Contract Law as
Private Law in China
As had happened in the Soviet Union after 1917, rigid state
planning took place in China in the 1950s, leaving no place for
autonomy in contracting.
As in the Soviet Union, given the fact that all means of
production were now controlled by the government on behalf of
every citizen, the only legally permissible contracts became
economic contracts. As a consequence, only SOEs and government
organs were allowed to contract. 39
Nevertheless, the nationalization of means of production and
private ownership along with the repudiation of all preexisting
contract laws did not mean that no rules were in place to regulate
contracts. It is said that, “up to 1958, 66% of 4000 regulations
dealt with the national economy.” 40 Most remaining laws
regulating contract were provisional decrees that were enacted to
implement the state economic plans. 41 For example, contracting
was regulated by Provisional Methods on Contractual Agreement
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. See the Administration Council Commission of Finance and Economy,
Provisional Methods on Contractual Agreement Made between Government
Agencies, State Enterprises, and Cooperatives arts. 2–5 (1950), See MO ZHANG,
supra note 23, at 3.
40. Gene T. Hsiao, The Role of Economic Contracts in Communist China,
53 CAL. L. REV. 1029 (1965).
41. The author is not arguing that there were no customs or informal local
rules that might have been dealing with contracts in the civil law sense in
Chinese society. However, whatever informal rules and dispute resolution
mechanisms that might have been available before the economic reform at the
end of 1970s, they were unofficial rules not recognized by the state and the
activities that they dealt with were not regarded as contracting by the state until
1999 when contract law was finally defined as civil law.
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Made between Government Agencies, State Enterprises, and
Cooperatives (hereinafter “Provisional Methods”), which was
issued in 1950 by the Commission of Finance and Economy under
State Council (the equivalent of the Supreme Economic Council in
the Soviet Union).42 In 1963, the Commission on Finance and
Economy issued another administrative regulation titled Tentative
Methods Regarding Mining Products Ordering Contracts
(hereinafter “Tentative Methods”). Other Ordering Contract
Regulations were issued during this period.
Under the Provisional Methods, a contract was an economic act
subject to state control. 43 The aim of such contracting activity was
to distribute the resources and products according to rigid state
economic plans and to satisfy every citizen’s quota. This is akin to
a system in which the state is a big company that employs every
citizen and everyone lives for free without drawing a salary.
During this so-called “lawless” era, the validity of contract was
not even a practical legal issue and was never worth fighting for.
Therefore, there was no mention of the nullity of contract in the
Provisional Methods and Tentative Methods. The purpose of
contracting was to “ensure the conscientious implementation and
all-around fulfillment of the state plan.” 44 In accordance with this
principle, parties entered into contracts not to maximize their
profits but to serve the state interest. No legal rights were vested in
the hands of contracting parties. It can be inferred that no contract
could be entered into except to carry out the state economic plan.
In such a context, it made sense that parties would not have to bear
the risk of financial loss. Actually, at that time, all businesses were
owned by the state, which provided 100% of the enterprise

42. See MO ZHANG, supra note 23, at 3.
43. See id.
44. See the Administration Council Commission on Finance and Economy,
Tentative Methods Regarding Mining Products Ordering Contracts art. 2 (1963).
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equity. 45 Each individual business entity had neither an
independent budget nor independent financial status. 46
As Pitman B. Potter described:
Enterprise budgets were fixed and were generally
unaffected by the nonfulfillment of contracts. Enterprise
managers bore very little responsibility for losses caused by
nonperformance of contracts, since such losses were
generally made up by the state, either through an
adjustment of the aggrieved party’s planned production
quota or by directly absorbing the deficit suffered by the
aggrieved party. 47
Under the 1950 Regulations, all contracts had to be registered
at the People’s Banks, 48 if the payment could not be processed
immediately, and contracts, upon conclusion, had to be filed with
the superior government and its economic commission, and also
filed in the record of the department of treasury. 49 Compulsory
dispute resolution mechanisms were in place before a contract
dispute could be adjudicated by a court. Disputes regarding to
nonperformance or breach of contract would have to be first
submitted to a higher governmental authority for mediation since
all businesses were owned by the state, and operated in the same
way as a government agency.
If both parties were from the same province or circuit, their
disputes had to be submitted to the higher level government’s
economic commission. 50 If the parties were from different
provinces or circuits, the disputes had to be submitted to the

45. Capital structure of SOEs include 100% of state equity and zero debt.
See JIAN CHEN, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN CHINA 52 (Routledge 2005).
46. See PITMAN B. POTTER, THE ECONOMIC CONTRACT LAW OF CHINA,
LEGITIMATION AND CONTRACT AUTONOMY IN THE PRC 32 (Univ. of
Washington Press 1992).
47. Id. at 27.
48. The People’s Bank is the central bank of China and the regulatory body
of China’s financial institutions.
49. Provisional Methods on Contractual Agreement Made between
Government Agencies, State Enterprises, and Cooperatives art. 10 (1950).
50. See id. at art. 10.
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economic commission under the central government. 51 A suit
could only be filed in court when such arbitration or mediation
from the higher authority could not solve the disputes. 52 Even
when a suit was eventually filed in court, it would probably not
concern the validity of contract. At first, government-run
businesses had no concern whether a contract had been concluded
legally, and whether the parties’ declaration of intention was
genuine. Since contracting was merely a form for recording state
economic plans, contracting parties signed contacts simply to
implement the executive order from higher government authorities,
which excluded any autonomous intention on the part of the
parties. Therefore, vices of consent, such as fraud and duress, as
understood in Western law, did not really violate a contracting
party’s consent. Moreover, even if fraud and duress did violate one
contracting party’s financial interest, the loss suffered by the
innocent party would be borne by the state and the unjust
enrichment that resulted would also be absorbed by the state.
The major dispute a court might be dealing with in that time
would be the failure to perform a contract. When this happened, a
contracting party could not choose the form of remedy, and no
monetary damages were available. The primary remedy was
always specific performance. 53 When there was a late delivery, the
remedy would probably “take the form of an apology and a
promise to deliver as soon as possible.” 54
Therefore, from 1950–1981, Chinese contract law was pure
public law. The Western idea of freedom of contract, which is
based on theories of will and the declaration of will, was not even
remotely applicable in China. 55 If German contract law can be

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

See id.
See id.
See POTTER, supra note 46, at 42.
Id.
See ZWEIGERT & KÖTZ, supra note 1, at 326.
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criticized for “containing only a few drops of social oil,” 56 Chinese
law, at that time, could be said to contain nothing but “social oil.”
4. 1981–1999: Fraud and Duress Make a Contract Null and
Void
The Third Plenary Session of the 11th Communist Party of
China Central Committee Meeting, held in 1978, changed the
direction of Chinese economy. The “Reforming and Opening Up”
policy was adopted at this meeting. The lawless era ended as soon
as China reopened its door to the world in 1979. The first contract
law statute, called Economic Contract Law (E.C.L.), was drafted in
1980 and became effective in 1981. The E.C.L. was the law that
governed domestic contracts. Another statute, the Foreign
Economic Contract Law, was enacted to regulate contracts entered
into with foreign parties. A third statute, the Technology Contract
Law, was also adopted to govern technology related contracts. The
concepts of private ownership and private economy were no longer
prohibited and were reintroduced as “a supplement to the socialist
economy”. 57 As a summary of the previous administrative
regulations, the E.C.L. was an essential component to carry out the
rigid state economic plan while at the same time allowing the
increased autonomy that an open market and private ownership
economy required. The E.C.L. was enacted with the purpose of
“ensuring the fulfillment of state plans.” 58 Further, following this
non-civil law definition, the E.C.L. allowed only legal persons to
be the parties to an economic contract. 59 Under this article,
economic contracts were defined as “agreements between legal
entities for the purpose of realizing certain economic goals and
specifying each other's rights and obligations.” 60 While
maintaining the concern with economic law, certain features of
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

See BASIL S. MARKESINIS, GERMAN LAW OF CONTRACT 45 (Hart 2006).
See Constitution of the People’s Republic of China art. 11.
See Economic Contract Law of the People’s Republic of China art.1
See id. art. 2.
Id.
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civil law emerged for the first time in the legislative history of the
People’s Republic of China. The contracting party, for the first
time, had a lawful interest in contracting 61 and contracting parties’
autonomy in contracting was recognized and protected. 62 Along
with increased autonomy, enterprises began to have independent
financial status and to bear contractual liabilities. Still, by the time
of the E.C.L.’s enactment, the effect of a planned economy was
dominant and the hard-won autonomy was very limited. The state
was still responsible for setting the market prices for products
according to planning. According to the E.C.L., the contract price
could only be negotiated when the state policy permits. 63
As a result, the concept of the nullification of contract was
introduced for the first time. The E.C.L., however, did not
distinguish relatively null contracts from absolutely null contracts.
It annulled the contracts that might be deemed relatively null under
French and German law. 64 According to the E.C.L., all the
following contracts are deemed null and void:
(1) contracts in violation of the law or state policies and plans;
(2) contracts signed through the use of fraud, coercion or similar
means;
(3) contracts signed by an agent beyond the scope of his power of
agency, or contracts signed by an agent in the name of his principal
with himself or with another person whom he represents; and
(4) economic contracts infringing on the interests of the state or the
public interest. 65
The striking effect of this article was that violation of state
plans was one of the grounds to rescind contracts, and the
61. Id. art. 1.
62. Id. art. 5. This article provides: “Economic contracts must be made
according to the principles of equality and mutual benefit, agreement through
consultation and compensation of equal value. Neither party is allowed to
impose its will on the other, and no unit or individual is allowed to interfere
illegally.”
63. Id. at art. 17(3), art. 23. Prices for both sales and lease contracts can be
negotiated by parties when prices are not set by the State.
64. See id. art. 7.
65. Id. at art. 7.
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existence of fraud and duress made a contract absolutely null rather
than relatively null. Also, acting beyond the scope of authority
rendered a contract null without recognizing later ratification by
the principal as a cure for nullity. This clear cut solution as to
defective contract was a reflection of the strong sense of protection
of state economic interest under which the protection of private
parties’ interest was secondary. By this time, freedom of contract
was not yet introduced. Also, protecting the safety of transaction
and bona fide third party were significantly outweighed by
safeguarding the state interest.
Though state control had been somewhat relaxed to leave room
for a private economy and private market, the planned economy
remained dominant. It might sound unsophisticated, by modern
continental civil law standards, to deprive the parties from contract
autonomy and to regard all annullable contracts as already null and
void. Nevertheless, it was an understandable result given the
historical context in China at that time in which the state had to
intervene and declare a contract null when the majority of legal
persons, as SOEs, didn’t have contractual autonomy and business
incentive to enforce their contractual rights on behalf of the state.
In the early stage of the economic reform, the state’s financial
interest in carrying out the economic plans without interference by
fraud and duress was superior to the protection of the small scale
privately owned enterprises’ business autonomy in deciding
whether to annul a contract when their consent was violated. After
all, the overriding purpose of contracting was to meet the needs of
the production and business operation under the mandate of the
state plans. 66 Many times, contracts had to be concluded under the
quota provided by the state and the conclusion of the contract had
to be authorized by a higher government authority. 67
66. See MO ZHANG, supra note 23, at 32 (Quoting SU HUIXIANG,
OF ECONOMIC CONTRACT LAW 3–5 (Liaoning People’s Press 1990)).

THEORY

67. See id. at 48. This situation happens when the business transactions
concerning products and items fall within the scope of state mandatory plans.
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On the other hand, in contrast to the West, where contracting is
a result of business judgment, the majority of the contracting
parties in China were simply carrying out the daily tasks assigned
by higher authorities. Therefore, it made sense to consider fraud
and duress as offenses to public policy and harms to public
interest. In Western law, contracts in violation of public policy or
morality are universally regarded as absolutely null or void.
Moreover, given the fact that when the E.C.L. was enacted,
virtually all business entities allowed to contract at that time were
owned by the state, and consequently no private interest could
have been harmed by the state intrusion in nullifying all contracts
concluded by fraud and duress. At the beginning of the economic
reform, private parties were simply not within the purview of the
E.C.L.
As a contract under the E.C.L. was not essentially a civil
juristic act, and no private interest was involved, the only party
bearing the loss caused by fraud and duress was the state.
Therefore, it seemed reasonable for the state to interfere with the
validity of all such contracts and to rescind them.
5. 1993–1999: The Emergence of a Market Economy and the
Obsolescence of the E.C.L.
a. Emergence of Private Ownership
Starting in 1980, a private economy first appeared among the
peasants’ households when a land tenure system named the Land
Contract Responsibility System was established. The state
allocated the cultivated land to peasant families. Families, as the
basic units, were responsible for producing a certain amount of
grain according to their assigned quota. Farmers were also allowed
to keep the surplus as their own when exceeding the quota. The
emergence of surplus created trade markets within each village
neighborhood that sold exclusively agricultural products. This
reintroduction of private ownership gave the farmers an incentive
to produce more. Private ownership was soon extended to urban

170

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 7

cities where privately owned business households were allowed to
operate. Such business entities were owned by individuals and
their families, without employees outside the family. 68 This smallscale business economy was favored by the Communist Party. A
party policy would soon allow these privately owned businesses to
hire employees, under the cover name of training “apprentices.”69
However, according to an administrative decree issued by the State
Council, the number of employees such privately owned
businesses were allowed to hire could not exceed seven. 70 This
limit was placed to make sure that private business could only
operate on a small scale so that state ownership would still be
dominant and the foundation of communism would not be
threatened. However, over the next few years, this restriction was
not strictly enforced, and economy based on private ownership
grew rapidly.
b. State-Owned Enterprise Reform to Allow Autonomy and
Incentives
The state-owned enterprise reform in China differs from
similar reforms in Eastern European and Latin American countries
where massive privatization took place. 71 The Chinese SOE reform
has been mainly about allowing SOEs to acquire limited business
autonomy and benefit from economic incentives rather than
divesting SOEs and introducing a sufficiently competitive and free
market. Admittedly, allowing economic motive improved SOE
performance and efficiency, whilst a mere increase of autonomy
and incentive does not guarantee the continued improvement of

68. In Marxism, capitalists, as business owners, obtain undue surpluses
from the exploitation of their employees. Employment with private employers
was deemed as an inherent feature in the capitalism that should not be allowed
in communist China.
69. Implementing Rules on Urban Individual Business Households art. 4
[城乡个体工商户管理条例Cheng Xiang Ge Ti Gong Shang Hu Guan Li Tiao
Li].
70. Id.
71. See generally WORLD BANK, BUREAUCRATS IN BUSINESS (Oxford Univ.
Press 1995)
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SOE performance. 72 Moreover, the pre-existing incentive
incompatibility and the information asymmetry between the state
and SOEs were not effectively addressed in the economic reform.
State interference with freedom of contract is still necessary to
effectively prevent SOEs from maximizing their own interest that
can be incompatible with the state economic goals.
Following the expansion of autonomy in the privately-owned
business, starting in 1984, a similar trend occurred among stateowned enterprises as well. On May 10th, 1984, an administrative
decree entitled “Provisional Regulations concerning the Expansion
of Autonomy for State-owned Industrial Enterprises” was issued
by the State Council. Several measures have been taken since then
to allow more autonomy in the operation of state enterprises and to
motivate employees. According to the decree, the SOEs were
allowed to sell their above-quota production at their discretion and
could even sell 2% of the planned production quota. 73 For the
goods at the SOEs’ disposal, SOEs can set the price within the
range of 20% less to 20% above the state price. 74 This was a
change in the over-centralized price control in China. In 1979,
there were 256 industrial products whose prices were subject to
mandatory state planning. 75 By 1984, this number was reduced to
60. 76 The trend has continued: the products whose prices are set by
the state now account for only 5% of those in the market.

72. Behavioral studies have shown that performance is not always
proportional to economic motive. And SOE reform in many other countries have
reached the consensus that, besides improving incentive structure, successful
SOE reforms also come with introducing competitive and free markets, toughen
SOE financial budgets, and divestiture of SOE ownership, etc. See WORLD
BANK, BUREAUCRATS IN BUSINESS, supra note 71, at 5. As a result, mere
increase of incentive doesn’t lead to better performance of SOEs.
73. Provisional regulations concerning the expansion of autonomy for
state-owned industrial enterprises (Quoted in SHAHID YUSUF, UNDER NEW
OWNERSHIP: PRIVATIZING CHINA’S STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES 56 (Stanford
Univ. Press (2006)).
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
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Another effort to motivate the SOE workers is to link their
work performance with profits and abolish their employment
tenure. The decree also allowed up to 3% of industrial workers to
receive merit raises 77 and by 1988, 60% of industrial workers were
subjected to a wage scheme that links their salaries to the profits of
the SOEs. 78 Also, starting in 1986, a new system was adopted to
deny life time employment to employees newly hired by the
SOEs. 79
The business autonomy of SOEs was further promoted by the
contract responsibility system, which was adopted in 1987.80
Under this system, SOEs will sign a performance contract with the
government, whose terms will extend for at least three years. These
contracts were all written negotiated agreements specifying
business goals for the SOEs to achieve within a given time
frame. 81 This scheme allows the SOEs to retain a large share of the
profits and arrangements were made to divide the cash flow
between the SOE and the government. 82
After over a decade of SOE reform, business autonomy greatly
increased as a result, nevertheless, such autonomy was still limited
and under the supervision of the state. As a survey conducted in
1994 suggested, daily operational rights had been delegated to
most of the SOEs while the autonomy to make major business
decisions such as mergers and acquisitions, investment, authority
to conduct international trade was reserved to a small percentage of
the SOEs. 83 According to this survey, 94% of the SOEs had
acquired autonomous decision making rights of production and
operation, 90.5% had acquired product sales rights, 95% acquired
product sales right, 86% had acquired the wage and bonus
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 59.
Id.
Id.
See JUSTIN YIFU LIN ET AL., supra note 15, at 61.

2014]

CHINESE CONTRACT LAW

173

allocation rights, 73.6% had acquired product pricing rights while
on the other hand, only 25.8% of SOEs had acquired import and
export rights, 46.6% had acquired asset disposing rights, 39.7%
acquired the joint operation and acquisition rights. 84
Still, the benefits of the increased autonomy is limited by the
facts that prices are still not completely determined by market,
state policy burden and corporate social responsibility results in the
overstaffing in virtually all SOE, which still hinder the efficiency
of SOEs. Without a sufficiently free and competitive market in
place, profit cannot serve as a sufficient information indicator of
SOE performance. The budget constraints on SOEs are not hard
enough and bank loans are still available upon request with interest
rates well below the market rates even when the banks are well
aware that this is risky lending. Moreover, the fact that the state
was the only or majority shareholder made it impossible for these
SOEs to adopt effective corporate governance structure.
As a result, the increased autonomy of SOEs is still not the
same as that of privately-owned enterprises in the West.
c. Introduction of Socialist Market Economy
To reflect and support these unstoppable changes in the
country’s economic system, the concept of socialist market
economy was introduced by the Party in 1993 at its 14th Central
Committee Meeting. Since then, in theory, means of production
and products should be now distributed by the market rather than
state planning.
As a result of these changes, a private interest now exists in the
economic contracts, and privately-owned businesses have acquired
the right to contract.
To facilitate the transformation of a planned economy to
market economy, the E.C.L. was amended in 1993; the Company

84. Id. (Quoting TAO SONG ET AL., MULTI-PERSPECTIVE THOUGHTS OF 40
ECONOMISTS ON THE SOE REFORM 91).
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Law of China was also adopted in the same year. 85 The amended
E.C.L. added peasant households and private-owned business
households as parties who are allowed to enter into economic
contracts. 86 Also, in the amended article 7 of the E.C.L., violation
of Communist Party economic policy was no longer a cause
leading to nullity, which signified the end of planned economy.
The then-newly enacted Company Law did not limit legal persons
to SOEs and therefore opened the floodgate to allow privatelyowned enterprises to register as corporations and assume the status
of legal persons. 87
The law regarding nullity remained unchanged, allowing the
state to step in even in cases where there should be relative nullity
and therefore a possibility of confirmation of the contract by the
aggrieved party. This still allows the state to invade the contract
autonomy.
Now that private parties have the financial incentive in
contracting, as in the West, when both parties to the contract are
privately owned entities, this approach to invalidity can no longer
be justified. As we have seen, the contract law of Western
jurisdictions is based on the principle of freedom of contract. As
noted in the Introduction, it allows the victim of fraud or duress to
protect his own interest by choosing whether the contract will or
will not be annulled. The privately-owned companies are legal
persons who have stronger incentives to protect their own interests
than the state. As such, they are in a better position to make
decision as to whether a contract should be annulled.
It is legitimate for the aggrieved party to have the option to
exercise the right to rescission when only their interest will be
affected by the decision. It is true that, in China, the majority of the
economy is still government-owned, and that SOEs play a more
85. Before the promulgation of Company Law, there were two separate
statutes dealing with state-owned enterprises and privately-owned enterprises
separately.
86. See Economic Contract Law art. 2 (1993).
87. See Company Law of the People’s Republic of China arts. 2–3 (1993).
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important role in the economy. 88 Nevertheless, in a market
economy, contractual autonomy should extend to them as well.
The state-owned enterprises are no longer established for the sole
purpose of implementing state policies. Most of them are for-profit
and operate under the leadership of their own management rather
than government authorities. Of course, the latter keep a
supervising power over the management, through the authority of
the State-owned Asset Supervision and Administration
Commission (SASAC)89, various ministries and financial
regulatory bodies. Still, they are market participants whose
interests should receive only as much protection as private parties.
It has been argued that, in the market economy, state-owned
enterprises’ interests are not equivalent to state interest. 90
III. FROM 1999 TO THE PRESENT: CONTRACTS ANNULABLE FOR
FRAUD AND DURESS WHEN NO STATE INTEREST IS INVOLVED
A. Contract Law in General and the Invalidity of Contract
In response to the rapid social and economic changes, the
uniform Contract Law of China was enacted to replace the three
separate statues and came into force in 1999. It is a fairly
westernized statute that retains only a few of the ideological
features of socialism. The new law protects the state interest in
private transactions, but cautiously.
88. 120 Centrally owned SOEs account for 62% of the Chinese GDP and
the total value of their fixed assets amounts to 120% of the Chinese GDP (Data
available at http://www.sasac.gov.cn/n1180/n1566/n258203/n259490
/13878095.html). See Li-Wen Lin & Curtis J. Milhaupt, We are the (National)
Champions: Understanding the Mechanisms of State Capitalism in China, 65
STAN. L. REV. 697, 735 (2013).
89. State-owned Asset Supervision and Administration Commission
(SASAC) was created in 2003 to exercise state’s shareholder rights within the
SOEs. SASAC has the authority to appoint the management personnel,
supervise major management decision-making and the use of state-owned assets.
See国务院关于机构设置的通知（国发〔2008〕 11 号）
[State
Council’s
Notice on Agency Creation] (Guo Fa (2008) No.11).
90. See 隋彭生 《合同法要义》134页 中国政法大学出版社 （2003）
[SUI PENG SHENG, ESSENCE OF CONTRACT LAW 134 (Press of China Univ. of
Political Science and Law 2003)].
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It is the first post–1949 law that defines contract law as an area
of civil law 91 and contracting as a voluntary act. 92 The law also
confirms the equal status of the contracting parties and allows
natural persons to enter into contracts. 93 For the first time, the law
would deal with the manner in which offers are made and
accepted. 94
The tension between articles 52 and 54 of the 1999 law was
pointed out in the Introduction. Article 54 provides that, as in
Western jurisdictions, a party who was induced to enter a contract
by fraud or duress may have it nullified or modified. Article 52
provides that a contact is “null and void” if it “is concluded
through the use of fraud or coercion by one party to damage the
interests of the State” (§1); if it “harms the public interest” (§4); or
if it “violates the compulsory provisions of the laws and
administrative regulations (§5).” To summarize the general rules, if
a contract was entered into through fraud and duress, it may be
annulled or modified upon the aggrieved party’s request 95 unless a
state interest is involved; in that event the contract is void ab
initio. 96 As discussed earlier, if the state were deemed to have an
interest under article 52 whenever a contract was made through
fraud and duress, all such contracts would be absolutely null, and
article 54 would be pointless. If the state were deemed to have an
interest, and a contract to be null, only if fraud and duress violated
some independent law or regulation, article 52(§1) would be
pointless. If neither article is pointless, there must be some
circumstances in which fraud and duress violate a state interest and
some in which they do not. Article 54, as we have seen, protects
party autonomy in a way that article 52 does not. The question then
91. See Contract Law art. 2.
92. See Contract Law art. 4. This is the Chinese expression of freedom of
contract.
93. See id. at art. 2.
94. See generally, id. at arts.14–31.
95. See Contract Law art. 54.
96. See Contract Law art. 52 (§1).
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is what protection party autonomy should receive in the present
Chinese economy?
Further, the situation can be complicated by the courts’
interpretations of G.P.C.L. article 58(§3), which, as mentioned in
the Introduction, has rendered all civil juristic acts induced by
fraud or duress absolutely null since 1986. Will the interpretation
of this provision change the law on invalidity of contract formed
through fraud or duress?
B. Party Autonomy and the Validity of Contracts
In practice, party autonomy is gaining more and more respect.
Although article 52(§1) allows a court to declare a contract formed
through fraud and duress to be null when a state interest is harmed,
in practice, this power is hardly ever exercised on the court’s own
initiative. Also, no judicial interpretation by the Supreme Court
and no case accessible by research suggest what the limits of this
power should be. Neither is there any existing judicial
interpretation as to whether the interest of SOEs constitutes a state
interest under article 52(§1).
Several positions regarding the meaning of article 52(§1) have
been taken by scholars. The first position is that the interest of
SOEs is not deemed to be a state interest; only fraud and duress
that violate criminal law qualify as fraud and duress that damage a
state interest. 97 The basis for this position is that Code of Criminal
Law does penalize the manager of a state-owned enterprise when
he or she was defrauded into entering a contract due to a neglect of
duty, and the result was a heavy loss to the state. 98
The second position is that a state interest includes political,
economic and security interests of the state but not that of stateowned enterprises. 99 Only when the content and purpose of the

97. See SUI PENG SHENG, supra note 90, at 134.
98. See Criminal Law of People’s Republic of China art. 167.
99. See MO ZHANG, supra note 23, at 170.
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contract induced by fraud or duress violate the public interest of
the society will the contract be regarded as null and void. 100
The third position is that “for the article 52(§1) to apply, the
harmful effect of the contract on the innocent party whose interests
represent those of the state must be so serious that no reasonable
person in the position of the innocent party would elect to confirm
the contract.” 101
The fourth position is that:
[I]n reality, there are many circumstances where contracts
are used for the purpose of misappropriating state assets
and therefore infringing upon state interest. However, due
to victim’s fear of being held liable or insensitivity to the
loss of state assets, heavy loss of state assets might be
resulted. If such contracts are not categorized as void per
se, it is not sufficient to protect state assets. 102
A consequence of the first two positions is that the “state
interest” in question is only a term interchangeable with “public
interest,” and that article 52(§1) does nothing more than rephrasing
article 52(§4). The third and fourth positions, however, seem to
provide an alternative by claiming that the state interest is that of
parties who represent the state and manage the state assets.
Accordingly, a state interest under article 52(§1) means the interest
of state-owned enterprises other than the public in general.
To solve this puzzle, I propose a three-step analysis. The first
step is to determine whether there is a state interest in a private
transaction entered into by a state-owned enterprise despite the
leading opinion that there is not. If there is a state interest, the
second step is to determine when that interest can be harmed by act
of fraud or duress in the formation of a contract. The third step is
100. 梁慧星 《民法总论》179页 法律出版社 [HUIXING LIANG, GENERAL
THEORIES OF CIVIL LAW 179 (3d ed., Law Press 2007)].
101. See BING LING, CONTRACT LAW IN CHINA 182, (Sweet & Maxwell Asia
2002).
102. 胡康生 《中华人民共和国合同法释义》79，80页 法律出版社
（1999）[HU KANGSHENG, INTERPRETATIONS OF CHINESE CONTRACT LAW 79–
80 (Law Press 1999)].
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to determine when such a state interest should be considered
“harmed” and under what circumstances the harm should be
remedied by declaring that the contract is null. Is there state
interest existing in private transactions that can be threatened by
fraud and duress?
1. Is there a State Interest in Private Transactions?
Yes, there is a state interest in private transactions when at least
one contracting party is a state-owned enterprise. There is a state
interest because the state is a shareholder of a business enterprise.
It used to be the case, as described earlier in this article, that the
state was the sole owner of all businesses. Government ownership
was the only legitimate ownership until the policy of reform and
openness. Now, there is an increasing number of privately-owned
enterprises, and in the stock market, there are state-owned
companies listed in which less than a majority of the shares are
tradable to prevent the state assets from going into the private
sector. As long as there is financial investment from government,
the investments in these companies constitutes state assets, which
are threatened by fraud and duress.
Yet the consequence is not that the state should always
intervene to protect its interests. Although the state has an interest
in protecting its assets, as a market participant, the state must
respect the autonomy of the parties in entering into a contract. The
state interest might be protected by interfering with party
autonomy. Yet, if the state nullifies every contract in which it has
an interest, the new recognition of contractual autonomy and
freedom of contract by 1999 Contract Law will again disappear on
Chinese soil since the state will be making the decision on behalf
of the contracting parties.
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2. What Interest is Article 52(§1) Protecting that can be
Harmed by Fraud and Duress in Contract Formation?
In my opinion, the only interest of the state that needs to be
protected from fraud and duress in a contractual transaction is the
SOEs’ interest, which represents the state’s pure financial interest
rather than public interest.
Public interest is a universal ground for nullity of contracts.
However, this interest doesn’t need protection from article 52(§1).
When the public interest is harmed, the contract can easily be
nullified on the ground of illegality, violation of public policy or
morality as suggested by laws in virtually all other jurisdictions.
These grounds are also available in §2–5 of article 52. According
to these subsections, a contract will be declared null, if the contract
is a sham transaction that harms the public interest or violates the
mandatory laws. In any event, if the state interest in question falls
within the state’s political, economic, or security interest—leaving
aside its interest in state-owned enterprises—such an interest will
be protected by article 52(§4) and (§5) rather than article 52(§1).
In addition, in the context of socialist market economy,
separation of SOEs from government has been regarded as one of
the core elements of SOE reform. Accordingly, the public policy
should be to treat SOEs equally as a market participant and to
reduce SOEs’ hidden advantages as much as possible. The public
policy here should be to prevent state from acting at the same time
both as a referee and a player. The financial interest of the SOE
therefore shall not be regarded as equivalent to a state or public
interest.
Admittedly, the Criminal Code penalizes the managers of stateowned enterprises for neglect of their duties if they allow
themselves to be defrauded into making contracts that result in
“heavy losses of the state interest.” 103 It does not penalize making
a contract with a state-owned enterprise by the use of fraud.
103. See Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China art. 167.
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Consequently, defrauding a state-owned enterprise is not a
violation of law that will make a contract null and void under
article 52(§5). There is no reason why, if the manager is penalized
for bad business judgment and gross negligence, the contract itself
should automatically become null. Consequently, in this context,
fraud and duress do not in themselves qualify as violations of
criminal law. 104 Moreover, contract law, being part of the civil law,
is not the appropriate forum to protect the state interest from
criminal conduct or conduct that violates the public interest.
On the other hand, as the sole or majority shareholder of the
SOEs, the state has had a long standing financial interest in
contracts made by state-owned enterprises ever since the time of
the planned economy.
To understand what state interest in China can be harmed by
fraud and duress, it is better to start by asking the question “why
don’t Western civil laws protect the state interest from fraud and
duress and make such contracts null and void?” The answer is that,
if fraud or duress violates law and public policy, the contract will
automatically be null and void. Nevertheless, a court will sit on its
hands when the only interest harmed is the private interest of a
private party. The reason is that without the existence or with very
limited existence of the state-owned companies, the state
presumptively has no or little interest in private transactions unless
law is violated or public order is offended. In China, given the
socialist features of its economic system, the state does have an
ownership interest in the private contract transactions entered by
state-owned enterprises. There will be no difference in each civil
law jurisdiction’s treatment towards fraud or duress that violates
criminal law or other statutory provisions, or when an absolute
simulation or a sham transaction takes place— such contracts will
be deemed null and void. The only interest China has that the

104. See SUI PENG SHENG, supra note 90, at 134.
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capitalist counterparts do not have is the state’s pure financial
interest in SOEs’ interest in private transactions.
This enlarged power of the state to intervene to annul private
contracts can be traced back to article 30 of 1922 Civil Code of
R.S.F.S.R., which states: “A civil juristic act made for a purpose
contrary to law, or in fraud of law, as well as a transaction directed
to the obvious prejudice of the State, shall be invalid.” Though this
provision is not exactly the same as article 52(§1), they both annul
contracts to protect the same interest – the financial interest of the
state and SOEs. Under this Soviet Civil Code article, an otherwise
legal contract that is directed to the obvious prejudice of the state is
absolutely null. The Soviet case law and jurisprudence tend to
suggest that the range of contracts that were deemed to be directed
to the obvious prejudice of the state covers was larger than those
covered by article 52(§1).
Most scholars have agreed that it was a device to guard against
the undesirable growth of private business and that it was enacted
in conformity with Lenin’s instruction “to enlarge the interference
of the State with the relations pertaining to private law and to
enlarge the right of the government to annul, if necessary, private
contracts.” 105 Another scholar, T.E. Novitskaya , refers to this
device as “an effective weapon in the hands of the Soviet
state.” 106The right of the state to interfere with any contracts made
in any area of civil law created a tool to avoid consequences
disadvantageous for the socialist economy. In a Russian Supreme
Court case, the court annulled sales contracts solely because SOEs
had an interest in the objects for sale. 107 Such annulments were
based on the “socially announced purpose of use” of the object. 108
In another case the high court annulled a lease and thereby
interfered with a party’s property right because the property right is
105. See GSOVSKI, supra note 24, at 426.
106. T.E. NOVITSKAYA, GRAZHDANSKIY KODEKS R.S.F.S.R. 1922
[R.S.F.S.R. Civil Code of 1922] 86 (Moscow State Univ., Moscow 2002).
107. Id.
108. Id.
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not absolute under the civil code, and the economic interest of the
SOE prevailed over the property right. 109 It can be inferred that had
the SOE been defrauded or under duress in contract formation, the
Soviet courts would have annulled the contract to protect the
financial interests of the SOE. Also, what makes this device more
powerful than article 52(§1) is the legal sanction: when a contract
is annulled under article 30, damages for unjust enrichment will be
collected by the state rather than the innocent party. 110
3. The Judicial Responses
Chinese courts are confused as to what the state interest refers
to and do not fully understand the distinction between absolute
nullity and relative nullity.
My observations are based on the study of 122 cases decided
under article 52.
Courts appear to be careful about declaring a contract to be
absolutely null and certainly have not done so without a request
from the innocent party. Courts seem to go by the checklist under
article 52. They declare the contract valid if none of the
circumstances under article 52 apply and no party requested that
the contract be rescinded.
Also in the majority of cases decided under article 52, contracts
were annulled under either article 52(§4) or article 52(§5) for
violation of the public interest or of a mandatory law. It is
noteworthy that in most of the cases that cited article 52(§4), the
courts never cited article 52(§1) or article 52(§2) at the same time,
where both provisions mention state interest. It is clear that in the
opinion of many courts, the state interest in question is not the
public interest but rather something else. There is a significant
number of cases where courts cited article 52(§1)–(§5) as authority

109. Id. at 87.
110. See R.S.F.S.R. Civil Code art. 147.
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to nullify a contract without reference to a specific subsection or
without providing any explanation.
Among these cases, only a few were decided under article
52(§1) and article 52(§2) where the state interest is identified. Is
the state interest under article 52(§2) the same as the state interest
under article 52(§1)? Given the logical structure of the article,
most likely the state interests in both these provisions refer to the
same thing – the SOEs’ interest. The only difference between the
two provisions is that when only one party committed the wrong in
contract formation, article 52(§1) is applicable to annul the
contract; when both parties collectively committed the wrong,
article 52(§2) is applicable. Also the level of state interference will
be upgraded when both parties are at fault: the state will annul the
contract when either state interest, collective interest (meaning the
rural villages’ interest) or a third party’s interest, is harmed.
The cases show that several Chinese courts do distinguish state
interest from public interest and acknowledge that the state interest
was really the SOEs’ financial interest. One district court openly
admitted that whenever an SOE’s interest is harmed, the state
interest is therefore harmed. 111 In this case where the court cited
article 52(§2), the plaintiffs were state-owned pharmaceutical
companies that entered into an agreement with two advertising
firms after the two firms prevailed in the bidding process.112
However, the plaintiff’s employees had leaked the confidential
information in the course of the bidding process to help the
defendants succeed. The court, in its opinion, stated that “the
employees of the two plaintiffs and two defendants committed
malicious collusion and therefore harmed the two plaintiffs’
interests. Given the fact that the two plaintiffs are state-owned
enterprises, when their interests are harmed, the state interest is
harmed.” In another case decided under article 52(§1), where a
111. San X Pharmaceutical JSC v. Ya Advertising LLC. 2010, Shen Luo Min
Er Chu Zi No. 3X4X (citation partially omitted).
112. Id.
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state-owned pharmaceutical company was defrauded by another
pharmaceutical company, the court annulled the contract, citing
article 52(§1) as the only authority, rather than using article 54.113
Here, the plaintiff and appellant, a state-owned company, had sued
in damages for non-performance, making no claim for dissolution.
The claim was dismissed but the court declared the contract null on
the basis of article 52(§1), though without explaining what the
state interest was. The only possible state interest at stake here was
the SOE’s financial interest. It is obvious that, according to both
the trial court and appellate court, the SOE didn’t have the option
to uphold the contract and sue in damages for non-performance
even though it might be more beneficial for the state and the SOE
to maintain the contract and obtain expectation damages. In a third
case, it was asserted that a malicious collusion took place between
the immediate past manager and legal representative of a stateowned gallery, the Gallery of Shenyang Municipality, and a
pharmacy that had been a lessee leasing space within the
Gallery. 114 It turned out that the manager kept the official stamp
after he left office and produced a lease that was a counterfeit
which renewed the lease for three years and lowered the rent from
1.15 million RMB to 0.8 million RMB. 115 The Gallery asked to
have the contract annulled because “the conspiracy resulted in the
loss of a state-owned enterprise.” 116 The trial court upheld the
validity of the contract based on the doctrine of apparent
agency. 117 The appellate court sided with the Gallery and annulled
the contract citing article 52(§2) because “the interest of Gallery of
Shengyang Municipality is harmed.” 118 No reasoning or
113. Henan Middle Pharmaceutical Company v. Dong Xueling & Hubei
Hualong Pharmaceutical Company 2011, 郑民二终字第1327号 [Zheng Min Er
Zhong Zi No.1327].
114. Shenyang Gallery v. Shenyang Taiyuan Street Pharmacy 2005, 沈民
（2）房终字第847号 [2005 Shen Min (2) Fang Zhong Zi No.847].
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
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explanation was given to identify one of the three interests listed in
article 52(§2). There was no collective or third party interest
involved, thus leaving only one logical explanation: the court must
have been of opinion that the Gallery, as an SOE, represented the
state interest. Therefore, it is fair to say that these courts are at least
of the opinion that the state interest protected by article 52 is
identical to the state-owned enterprise’s interest.
The courts, however, are not unanimous. In another case, the
court did not nullify the contract even though the state-owned
hospital was defrauded in a licensing agreement for a patent and
had claimed rescission of the contract based on article 52(§1). 119
The hospital could no longer request nullification on the basis of
article 54, due to the one-year prescription. Nullity remained
possible on the basis of article 52(§1) where contracts that are
absolutely null are imprescriptible according to a recently
published Supreme Court case. 120 The court’s only line of
reasoning was that “a state-owned enterprise’s interest is not the
equivalent of state interest” and therefore article 52(§1) was not
applicable. 121 It is worth mentioning that victims of fraud or duress
try to use article 52(§1) as a last resort to nullify a contract when
the one-year prescriptive period for annullable contracts runs out
and the victims happen to be SOEs. 122
4. When is the State Interest Harmed, and under what
Circumstances shall the Article 52(§1) Power be Exercised?
My answer to the third question is that the state or a third party
can only step in to have a court declare a contract formed under
fraud or duress to be null when the situation is so deleterious that
119. Tao Zhenhai v. Liaohe Oil Field Center Hospital 2006, 沈民四知初字
第65号 [2006 Shen Min Si Zhi Chu Zi No.65].
120. Guangxi BeiSheng Co. Ltd v. Beihai Weihao Real Estate Development
Co. Ltd 2005, 民一终字第104号 [2005 Min Yi Zhong Zi] (Published in May,
2013).
121. See supra note 119.
122. See Contract Law art. 54.
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the failure of the state-owned enterprise to seek restitution
constitutes a neglect of duty. Such strings must be attached to
prevent the state from abusing its power, and thereby harm the
safety of transactions. In addition, it is not always in the state’s
own financial interest to rescind a contract made under fraud or
duress.
If the state tried to seek annulment of every contract induced
by fraud or duress on behalf of the state-owned enterprises, the
state-owned enterprises would lose their autonomy as market
players to make a business decision in their best interest. Stateowned enterprises would then be pure government agencies rather
than business entities. After all, since a government-led market
economy has been established in China, private transactions are no
longer mere forms in which state supplies are operated. Stateowned enterprises now have independent financial status and
independent management. Such intrusion, if allowed, would
greatly discourage commercial transactions because people would
be more concerned in making contracts where a third party or the
state can step in and declare it null without their consent.
Also, as previously described, it might be in the state’s
economic interest to enforce a contract even though it was made by
means of fraud or duress. The reasons might be that expectation
damages for non-performance are greater than reliance damages
that may be granted in addition to nullity, or that some market
change made it beneficial to enforce such a contract. Also, the
object of the contract might simply be of great subjective value to
the state-owned enterprise, and therefore creates a legitimate
reason for the company to enforce it regardless of fraud or duress.
Therefore, in my opinion, the enlarged state power to annul
contracts can only be exercised when there is neglect in the
performance of a duty and that neglect is so severe that no
reasonable businessman would choose to enforce the contract after
knowing of the fraud or being released from duress.
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Further, state intervention can be justified by the lack of a
sufficiently free and competitive market and the lack of a sufficient
information indicator to evaluate the SOE performance.
We discussed the aggrieved party’s incentive to act in its best
interest in evaluating the financial consequences of nullification.
Even though reforms have been carried out to invigorate SOEs, the
state-owned enterprises are not sufficiently business-driven. The
absence of effective shareholding and corporate governance results
in a lack of management accountability. Managers in state-owned
enterprises are more like government employees than businessmen
and are short of personal incentive and financial stake in running
the business. Throughout the SOE reforms around the world, it has
been observed that “bureaucrats typically perform poorly in
business, not because they are incompetent, but because they face
contradictory goals and perverse incentives that can distract and
discourage even very able and dedicated public servants.” 123
In China, SOE managers receive salaries that are comparable
to government employees with similar bureaucratic ranks, and
directors and officers can be laterally transferred to other
government agencies in the event the SOE goes bankrupt.
Therefore, unlike privately-owned businesses, profit maximization
is never the top priority of these government-employed
businessmen who are tasked to carry out state policies and held
accountable only to the state. Since these quasi state-officials are
not nearly as motivated as private entrepreneurs, since they are not
accountable to shareholders for their grossly negligent business
decisions, one may expect poor judgment when it comes to decide
whether a contract should be nullified. 124
Also, given the bad experience China had had during the
economic reform in giving SOE managers too much autonomy and

123. See WORLD BANK, supra note 71, at 3.
124. 浙江省金华县人民法院（1992）白民初字第57号 [Zhe Bai Min Chu
Zi No. 57 (1992)]
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incentive 125 and the incentive incompatibility that the reform fails
to cure with both the policy induced burden and absence of a
competitive market, this situation is unlikely to improve in the
foreseeable future. Despite the introduction of a market economy,
the state, as the owner of the SOEs, has its own policy agenda that
needs to be carried out by SOEs, which is often incompatible with
normal business incentives. For example, SOEs often have to carry
out policy burdens such as the “policy-induced over-staffing” in
order to assist the state in “resettling the redundant workers”. 126
Also, as the main forces in pursuing the state economic objectives,
SOEs still don’t have the complete autonomy in choosing their
production direction. 127 Price distortion still exists to serve the
state development strategies. 128 Unlike in the West, profit alone
usually does not accurately reflect the efficiency and diligence of
the management. It is possible that a poorly managed enterprise
can still generate significant profits due to the lack of competition
and superficial entry barriers created by government. Under such
circumstances, if the state totally keeps its hands off SOE
management decision making, it is possible for the manager to
125. Jian Chen, in his book Corporate Governance in China, described one
of the lessons:
Contract responsibility systems were introduced in most large and
medium-sized state industrial enterprises during 1986–1997. The
system was officially intended to place government ownership at arm’s
length to enterprise management, so allowing more decision making
space (business autonomy) to the latter. In the contract, the firm hands
over an agreed amount of annual profit and tax for which they have
contracted. It was permitted to retain a proportion of any surplus it
achieved above the contract level. Also, the firm guaranteed to invest to
increase asset value and to develop technology by an agreed amount,
using retained profit during the contract period. But substantial
collusion soon emerged between the directors, and the heads of the
supervising government departments, leading to widespread corruption.
The directors found that it was easier or quicker to reward themselves
by transferring the firm’s assets to their own firms. The lesson was that
it was not feasible to relinquish control to the firm’s managers in
attempt to improve performance.
See JIAN CHEN, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN CHINA 38–39 (Routledge 2009).
126. See JUSTIN YIFU LIN ET AL., supra note 15, at 114.
127. See id. at 119–120.
128. See id. at 145.
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neglect the management duty to effectively protect state-owned
assets and the SOE’s financial interest without being noticed by the
state, if the state, as the majority shareholder, only looks at the
usual information indicators as in the West.
These endogenous features inherent in Chinese economy
warrant the state’s supervisory role over the SOEs. In response to
the incentive incompatibility, information asymmetry, and liability
disproportionality discussed above, it is legitimate for the state to
nullify otherwise annullable contracts when affording the SOE
management the option to confirm a contract that would harm the
state’s interest in the SOE. Nevertheless, a court cannot rescind an
annullable contract on its own initiative when neither party is an
SOE. If both parties are private companies, then no such state
interest will be involved. The state should not intervene, no matter
how serious the consequence of fraud or duress is, and how big a
financial loss the innocent party suffers.
Also, the state should not be able to rescind an annullable
contract where the only aggrieved party is an SOE but there is a
reasonable business choice not to rescind it. This may be in order
to benefit from a market change or to obtain greater damages, or
because the contract has a reasonable subjective value to the
aggrieved party.
C. Further Confusions Caused by Article 58(§3) of the G.P.C.L.
As mentioned above, G.P.C.L. article 58(§3) adds to the
complexity of the puzzle this article tries to resolve.
Though the G.P.C.L. assume their status as the highest law in
the realm of civil law, as a general law, it is trumped by special
laws such as contract law statutes, should any conflict exist. The
GPLC govern civil juristic acts, of which contracts are a category.
Every time a contract is induced by fraud or duress, a potential
conflict between the Contract Law and the G.P.C.L. arises.
Presumably, this outdated law should either be no longer
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applicable or only applicable to civil juristic acts other than
contract, in application of the civilian principle that special rules
take precedence over general rules (specialia generalibus
derogant). This would keep article 58(§3) away from further
confusing the conflict between article 52 and article 54 of the
Contract Law. However, an examination of 35 cases decided under
article 58 in the past 23 years reveals a different story. It appears
that when an SOE is harmed by a civil juristic act induced by fraud
or duress, article 58(§3) merely extends the article 52(§1)
protection of SOEs’ financial interest afforded to the civil juristic
acts by imposing the absolute nullity of civil juristic acts when
induced by fraud or duress. Also, a court might use article 58(§3)
to enlarge its contract nullification power and infringe the
autonomy established by article 54 of the Contract Law, by
considering the contract simply as a civil juristic act rather than
characterizing it as a contract.
For contracts entered into between 1986 and 1999, when
nullifying economic contracts formed under fraud or duress, courts
usually cited both G.P.C.L. article 58 and E.C.L. article 7. 129 This
was probably because contracting was deemed both a civil juristic
act and an economic contract. When nullifying contracts between
individuals where the contracts did not fall within the regime of the
E.C.L., courts only cited G.P.C.L. article 58. 130 In a case decided
in 1992, a sale of an apartment between two individuals was
nullified because of a fraudulent misrepresentation by the
defendant. 131 The act of sale was deemed a civil juristic act rather
than a contract and therefore was annulled under G.P.C.L. article
58(§3) rather than under the special contract law. The court did not
explain why this sale was not a contract. Most probably, because
only juristic persons or business entities were allowed to enter into
129. See (1992) 渝经上字第377号 [Yu Jing Shang Zi No.377 (1992)].
130. This is contrary to the traditional view that contracts between
individuals were not regulated before 1999.
131. 浙江省金华县人民法院（1992）白民初字第57号 [Zhe Bai Min Chu
Zi No. 57 (1992)].
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economic contracts and because the sale did not comply with rigid
form requirements under the E.C.L. 132, the E.C.L. was not
applicable to the case.
For contracts entered into from 1999 to present, in theory,
courts are supposed to apply article 58 (§3) to nullify civil juristic
acts that are not regarded as contracts. 133 In such cases, these
juristic acts induced by fraud or duress are absolutely null, and
therefore can be nullified on the court’s own initiative. For
example, in a 2005 Supreme Court case, a company in the business
of international trade deceived a state-owned bank into issuing
letters of credit through a series of misrepresentations when
applying for the letters. 134 The court held that the issuance of such
letters of credits was null because they were civil juristic acts that
fall within the scope of article 58(§3). 135 Article 58(§3) is used as
an extension of the article 52(1) power into the state-owned bank’s
issuance of letters of credit.
Also, in several private loan disputes cases, courts unanimously
treated the signing of an informal acknowledgement of debts
(“IOU”) under the threat of physical violence 136 and a payment by
the wife of the alleged debt of the husband when the wife was
defrauded by a falsified IOU 137 as absolutely null juristic acts.
These annulments were based solely on article 58(§3).
However, courts sometimes use article 58(§3) as a vehicle to
annul contracts for fraud or duress, without mentioning article 52
132. For example, under the E.C.L. art. 3, an economic contract should be in
writing. Article 12 lists a series of main provisions that should be included in an
economic contract.
133. For example, when a person made a will under duress, to nullify the
will, the court has to apply art. 58(§3) of the G.P.C.L. rather than art. 54 of the
Contract Law.
134. See（2005）民四终字第21号 [Min Si Zhong Zi No.21(2005)].
135. Id. In the West, a letter of credit is regarded as a contract. However, in
China, courts are not certain whether the letter shall be defined as a contract. In
this case, the court seemed to be convinced that the letter of credit was a civil
juristic act that was not a contract.
136. See (2009) 浙台商终字第98号 [Zhe Tai Shang Zhong Zi No.98
(2009)].
137. See (2008) 豫驻民三终字第417号 [Yu Zhu Min San No.417 (2005)].
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or article 54 of the Contract Law, thus preferring the general law to
the special law. This preference is generally a distinction without a
difference since the victim usually requested the court to nullify
the transaction anyway. Nevertheless, sometimes courts tend to
nullify contracts on their own initiative when the victim of fraud or
duress might in theory choose to perform the contract regardless of
relative nullity.
In a case decided in 2009, the plaintiff filed suit to have the
court annul a settlement agreement signed by him under duress. 138
In this case, the plaintiff and defendant were fathers of a newlywed couple who were having disputes over each other’s share of
the wedding expenses. 139 The defendant brought over 40 relatives
and hooligans to the plaintiff’s house. The group not only beat the
plaintiff but also forced him to sign a settlement agreement.
Without addressing the possibility that this agreement may be
considered a contract, the court treated it as an absolutely null civil
juristic act, solely based on the application of article 58(§3). 140
IV. CONCLUSION
In contrast with Western civil law systems in which contract
law theories are based on freedom of contract and the expression
of the will, the post–1949 Chinese contract law is based on a
system in which government ownership of the economy dominates
and the market is not yet free and competitive. Upon China’s
adoption of a market economy, the role of contract has been slowly
and reluctantly moving from public economic law, which
emphasizes state regulatory control, to private civil law, which
requires contractual autonomy and more limited state interference.
The SOE reform that has allowed SOEs more autonomy, but has
not yet provided the solution to cure the incentive incompatibility,
information asymmetry, and liability disproportionality between
138. See (2009)甘民初字第2902号 [Gan Min Chu Zi No. 2902 (2009)].
139. Id.
140. Id.
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the state and SOEs. Under these circumstances, freedom of
contract, though adopted by the Chinese Contract Law, will be
abused by SOEs at the expense of the state if made applicable to
them without additional strings. The interference with freedom of
contract, as exemplified by Contract Law article 52(§1), is a
reasonable solution to prevent the abuse. Nevertheless, such a state
intrusion must be restricted and narrowly tailored to permit the
rescission of contracts only when rescission was not sought due to
a neglect of a duty by those in charge of state-owned enterprises.
Despite my arguments, it remains uncertain, as we have seen
from the various cases, how the Chinese courts interpret this state
interest in practice. Foreign corporations, when conducting
business in China and contracting with Chinese state-owned
enterprises, should know that the validity of their contracts may
depend on such an extensive state power when state interest is at
stake. The scope of this power might be as narrow as this article
proposes: it might extend to the state-owned enterprises’ interest
under extreme circumstances. Yet, it might also be broadly applied
to protect SOEs’ financial interests under ordinary circumstances
and SOEs might not be afforded the option to keep the contract
when it was induced by fraud or duress. Another possibility is that
article 52(§1) will be applied to protect other state interests. In that
event, however, article 52(§1) will merely be a paraphrase of the
protection of public interest under article 52(§4), as in all the
Western legal systems in which violation of public order is a
ground for absolute nullity of contract.

